

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 106802 POSS DUPE
ORIGIN ACDA-10

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BERN
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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 106802
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 106802 POSS DUPE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, TECH

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS MEETING, APRIL 28-29, 1977 -
SOVIET STATEMENT

REF: STATE 100222

1. REFTEL (PARA 1) MENTIONED PREPARED STATEMENT BY SOVIET

UNION (MOROKHOV) WOULD BE PROVIDED SEPTEL. UNOFFICIAL
TRANSLATION FOLLOWS IN PARA 2.

2. BEGIN TEXT. QUOTE

THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THE PROBLEMS OF NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS WELL-KNOWN. IT WAS
REPEATEDLY STATED IN STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET LEADERS.
THE SOVIET UNION IS IN FAVOUR OF TAKING TOGETHER WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL MEASURES AIMED AT RELI-
ABLE PREVENTION OF FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES
OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT
AND TECHNOLOGY SHOULD NOT BECOME THE CHANNEL OF PROLIFERA-
TION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE LONDON GUIDE-
LINES FOR NUCLEAR EXPORT IN WHICH 15 COUNTRIES NOW

PARTICIPATE HAS PLAYED AND IS CONTINUING TO PLAY A
POSITIVE ROLE IN REDUCING POSSIBILITIES FOR THE USE OF
ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR THE PRO-
DUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE
DEVICES.

NOW WE WOULD LIKE TO STATE THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET
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PAGE 03 STATE 106802 POSS DUPE

UNION ON THE MAIN PROBLEMS THAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE
SOLVED IN THE COURSE OF THE SUPPLIERS MEETING.

1. FIRST OF ALL WE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO STATE OUR
VIEWS ON THE MAJOR PROBLEM - THE PROBLEM OF APPLYING OF
FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS IN RESPECT OF ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES.

AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED, IT IS NECESSARY TO
INTRODUCE INTO "THE GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS",
WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED UPON EARLIER, ADDITIONAL PROVISION
WITH THE PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING CONTROLS FOR NUCLEAR
EXPORT. THE EXPEDIENCY OF SUCH A MEASURE IS SHARED, WE
BELIEVE, BY A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHICH DECLARED OF THEIR
DETERMINATION TO TAKE MEASURES TOWARD INSTITUTION OF MORE
STRINGENT MEASURES OF CONTROL FOR NUCLEAR EXPORT.

IT IS EXACTLY WITH THIS AIM IN VIEW THE SOVIET
DELEGATION HAS INTRODUCED ITS PROPOSAL DURING OUR LAST
MEETING ON NOVEMBER 11, 1976. THE GIST OF THIS PROPOSAL
IS THAT SUPPLIERS SHOULD AUTHORISE TRANSFERS OF ITEMS
FROM THE TRIGGER LIST TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE ONLY
ON CONDITION THAT SUCH A STATE ACCEPTS THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS
IN RESPECT OF ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. WE POINT OUT WITH
SATISFACTION THAT THIS PROPOSAL HAS EXERCISED A WIDE

MEASURE OF SUPPORT LAST NOVEMBER. HOWEVER THE GROUP
COULD NOT TAKE A DECISION ON THIS QUESTION SINCE A NUMBER
OF DELEGATIONS WERE NOT READY TO DO IT.

WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS ONCE AGAIN THAT GIVING OUR
CONSENT TO ACCEPT THE "GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS"
THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDED FROM THE FACT THAT THESE GUIDE-
LINES ARE MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS PUT FORWARD IN RESPECT OF
NUCLEAR EXPORT AND THAT THESE GUIDELINES WOULD BE
REVIEWED WITH THE PURPOSE OF MAKING CONTROLS MORE STRINGENT.
A SPECIFIC DATE FOR SUCH A REVIEW OF THE GUIDELINES HAD
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PAGE 04 STATE 106802 POSS DUPE

BEEN SET UP - BEFORE THE END OF 1976.

AT THIS MEETING THE DELEGATIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE TABLING A JOINT DRAFT PROVISION
OF A NEW PARA. 4 OF THE GUIDELINES WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:

"SUPPLIERS SHOULD ONLY TRANSFER TRIGGER LIST ITEMS,
INCLUDING TECHNOLOGY AS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE
GUIDELINES AND IN PART B OF THE TRIGGER LIST TO THOSE
RECIPIENT COUNTRIES WHO ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL
THEIR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. THEY SHOULD ALSO OBTAIN SATIS-
FACTORY ASSURANCES THAT A RECIPIENT COUNTRY WILL MAKE
PROVISION FOR DURATION AND COVERAGE TO STANDARDS NOT LESS
THAN THOSE SPECIFIED IN IAEA DOCUMENT GOV/1621, 20 AUGUST
1973."

THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER OTHER
MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING THE REGIME OF NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

2. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT A PARTICULAR DANGER FROM THE
POINT OF VIEW OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CON-
NECTED WITH TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY OF CHEMICAL REPRO-
CESSING OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND URANIUM ENRICHMENT,
THE SOVIET DELEGATION STANDS IN FAVOUR OF UNDERTAKING
BY SUPPLIERS OF ESPECIALLY RIGID RESTRICTIONS WITH RESPECT
TO THESE TYPES OF TECHNOLOGY. IN THIS CONNECTION WE ARE
IN FAVOUR OF UNDERTAKING BY COUNTRIES-SUPPLIERS AN OBLIGA-
TION NOT TO TRANSFER HENCEFORTH INSTALLATIONS, EQUIPMENT
AND TECHNOLOGY FOR CHEMICAL REPROCESSING OF SPENT NUCLEAR
FUEL AND ON URANIUM ENRICHMENT.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT SERIOUS ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO
THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTION OF ACCUMULATION IN NON-NUCLEAR
WEAPON COUNTRIES OF CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF NUCLEAR
MATERIALS WHICH CAN BE USED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR
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PAGE 05 STATE 106802 POSS DUPE

WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. COUNTRIES-SUPPLIERS SHOULD, WHILE NEGOTIATING CONTRACTS FOR TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, PUT FORWARD AS A CONDITION OF SUCH TRANSFERS EVENTUAL RETRANSFERS OF THESE MATERIALS TO COUNTRIES-SUPPLIERS OR TO REGIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE CENTERS WHICH ARE UNDER THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS. FOR THIS PURPOSE IT COULD BE POSSIBLE TO ADD TO "GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS" A PROVISION THAT NUCLEAR FUEL SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED ON CONDITION THAT A RECIPIENT COUNTRY WILL UNDERTAKE TO RETRANSFER IT TO COUNTRY-SUPPLIER OR TO REGIONAL FUEL CYCLE CENTERS. EXACTLY FROM THIS PRINCIPLE THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDS IN ITS PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES.

IN OUR OPINION, COUNTRIES-SUPPLIERS SHOULD ALSO EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF ACCUMULATION IN LABORATORIES AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CENTERS OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON COUNTRIES OF CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF PLUTONIUM AND OTHER NUCLEAR MATERIAL WHICH WAS RECEIVED FOR RESEARCH,

MEDICAL AND OTHER PURPOSES. WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF TAKING STRINGENT MEASURES TO LIMIT ACCUMULATION OF THESE MATERIALS IN NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON COUNTRIES, HAVING IN MIND, THAT THESE MATERIALS CAN BE USED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

4. AMONG IMPORTANT MEASURES ON STRENGTHENING THE SYSTEM OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WE SHOULD MENTION ALSO THE QUESTION OF CREATION OF REGIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CENTERS UNDER THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS WELL AS OTHER MEASURES ON INTERNATIONALISATION OF REPROCESSING AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS. AS BEFORE THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS IN FAVOUR OF CREATION OF THESE CENTERS. WE CONSIDER THAT THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SHOULD BE MORE ACTIVE IN ITS STUDIES OF THESE PROBLEMS. IT REFERS IN THE FIRST PLACE TO THE STUDY OF A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL, CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 106802 POSS DUPE

ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND OTHER QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE CREATION OF REGIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE CENTERS.

5. A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE IN WORKING OUT POLICY IN THE FIELD OF CONTROLLING NUCLEAR TRANSFERS WOULD BE, IN OUR OPINION, AN ARRANGEMENT AMONG COUNTRIES-SUPPLIERS ON HOLDING ON A REGULAR BASIS OF MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WHEN AGREEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED ON THE TRANSFERS OF CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS OR FOR RENDERING OF CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE TO A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.

IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE SUPPLIERS COULD REACH AN

AGREEMENT ABOUT THE EXCHANGE ON A REGULAR BASIS OF INFORMATION RELATING TO THE TRANSFERS OF ITEMS FROM THE TRIGGER LIST TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES - NOT PARTIES TO THE NPT.

IT IS KNOWN THAT THE EXCHANGE OF APPROPRIATE INFORMATION IS CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARRANGEMENT OF A GROUP OF COUNTRIES ON AUGUST 22, 1974 ON ARTICLE III.2 OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. IN OUR OPINION THIS ARRANGEMENT COULD BE TAKEN BY THE SUPPLIERS AS A BASIS.

6. THE QUESTIONS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS TAKE AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE SYSTEM OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROTECTION IS TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNAUTHORISED REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND SABOTAGE IN THE PROCESS OF THEIR PRODUCTION, STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION OR USES.

7. AT THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS OF THE SUPPLIERS GROUP THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS ON CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN TOUCHED UPON. IN THIS CONNECTION CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 106802 POSS DUPE

THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO DECLARE ITS POSITIVE, IN PRINCIPLE, ATTITUDE TOWARD WORKING OUT OF SUCH SANCTIONS. WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON THIS QUESTION. UNQUOTE. END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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